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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ANTIDUMPING LAW: THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE Es-
TABLISHES THE GUIDELINES THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COM-
MISSION MUST FOLLOW IN ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF AN Ex-
ISTING ANTIDUMPING ORDER
Plaintiffs, several Japanese manufacturers of television sets,1
sought review in 1982 of the International Trade Commission's
(ITC) ten-year-old determination 2 that their imports threatened
an industry in the United States with injury. 3 After a ten-month
investigation 4 the ITC ruled that it would not disturb its 1971 find-
'The plaintiffs were Matsushita Elec. Co., Ltd., Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am.,
Panasonic Hawaii, Inc., Panasonic Sales Co. (a division of Matsushita Elec. of Puerto Rico,
Inc.); Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., United States JVC Corp.; Sanyo Elec. Co., Ltd., Sanyo
Elec., Inc., Sanyo Mfg. Corp.; Hitachi, Ltd., Hitachi Sales Corp. of Am., Hitachi Sales Corp.
of Hawaii; Sharp Elec. Corp; Toshiba Corp., Toshiba Am., Inc., Toshiba Hawaii, Inc.; Mit-
subishi Elec. Corp.; and Gen. Corp. of Japan. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United
States, No. 83-69, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade July 14, 1983), reprinted in 17 Cust. B. & Dec.,
Aug. 10, 1983, at 37, 39 n.1.
2 The orginal finding was published in Television Receiving Sets From Japan, 36 Fed.
Reg. 4576 (1971).
3 Television Receiving Sets From Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. 32, 702 (1981). The plaintiffs
sought review of the order under the authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (Supp. V 1981), which
provides: (b)(1)-Whenever the administering authority or the Commission [ITC] receives
information concerning, or a request for the review of,. . .an affirmative determination
... which shows changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a review of such determina-
tion, it shall conduct such a review after publishing notice of the review in the Federal
Register.
At the time of the 1971 ruling the ITC was required to find only "injury" to a domestic
industry before an antidumping order could be imposed. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
amended 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (Supp. V 1981) so that the ITC must now find "material
injury" before the Treasury Department can issue trade regulations (see infra notes 32-36).
Section 1673d(b) now reads:
(i) In general The Commission shall make a final determination of whether-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially re-
tarded,by reason of imports of the merchandise with respect to which the ad-
ministering authority has made an affirmative determination [that merchandise
is being sold in the United States at less than its fair value].
The ITC announced it would review the earlier determination on Sept. 16, 1980, and it
set a deadline of Jan. 13, 1981, for termination of the investigation. Due to difficulties in
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ing nor the antidumping order which had been issued in conjunc-
tion with it.6 The ITC acknowledged it was making its ruling in
spite of information showing a sharp decrease in imports in Japa-
nese televisions' and considerable improvement in the health of
the domestic industry;7 the majority of the Commissioners, how-
ever, felt that the ITC's investigative duty did not end with the
assessment of present data but that it also entailed the prediction
of what economic circumstances would follow lifting of the an-
tidumping order.8 Based upon its examination of the evidence
available concerning the predicted reaction of the Japanese manu-
facturers, the ITC ruled that material injury to the domestic tele-
vision industry would recur if the order was lifted.9 On appeal to
obtaining data from the Japanese television manufacturers, however, the ITC extended its
deadline for gathering data until June 12, 1981. Television Receiving Sets from Japan, 46
Fed. Reg. 24,034 (1981).
• Television Receiving Sets From Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,702 (1981).
In the five years preceding the 1981 investigation, imports from Japan had fallen 91%,
the ITC found. The commissioners attributed this drop to the establishment by 10 Japanese
firms of manufacturing plants within the United States after the imposition of the original
antidumping order. This restructuring of manufacturing operations caused the reclassifica-
tion of television receivers from imports to domestic production. Id. at 32,704-05.
" The ITC found that in the five years prior to 1981 production in the domestic television
manufacturing industry had risen 80%; capacity, 25%; and shipments, 70%; while capacity
utilization had increased to 88% of full potential. Id. at 32,705.
8 The ITC found this duty to assess future intentions of importers in the event of lifting
of an antidumping order in its own regulations:
Upon the receipt of information concerning, or upon a request for review of, a
determination.. .which resulted in an order issued under the Antidumping
Act,. . the Commission shall institute an investigation to determine, as the case
may be: (1) Whether, in light of the changed circumstances, the agreement contin-
ues to completely eliminate the injurious effect of imports of the merchandise; or
(2) whether an industry in the United States would be materially injured, or
would be threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in
the United States would be materially retarded, by reason of imports of the mer-
chandise covered by the. . .antidumping order if the order were to be modified or
revoked.
Investigation to review outstanding determinations, 19 C.F.R. § 207.45 (1983), Television
Receiving Sets From Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,704 (1981).
9 Commissioner Paula Stern dissented from the determination that the antidumping or-
der was still required. She charged that the majority had departed from the standard of
review which the ITC had established for itself in previous cases in which review of existing
regulations was undertaken:
[Section 1675(b)(1) (see supra note 3)] provides no explicit criteria for analysis
of the presence of material injury, or the threat thereof. However, a careful review
of the statute, the legislative history, past Commission practice, relevant interna-
tional agreements, and the underlying purpose of the relevant section of the law
suggests an appropriate basis for review. The underlying purpose of (the section)
is to remove unnecessary barriers to trade in the form of antidumping duties
which are no longer necessary and will not be necessary to protect U.S. industries
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the Court of International Trade, held: reversed. The ITC failed to
found its prediction of material injury in the face of a lifted an-
tidumping order on the statutorily required basis of "substantial
evidence."' 0 Matsushita Electric Industry Company v. United
States, No. 83069, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade July 14, 1983), re-
printed in 17 Cust. B. & Dec., at 37.
Dumping has been defined as "price discrimination between na-
tional markets."" The motive of the dumping party in selling its
goods in a foreign market at a price lower than their fair value in
the home market may vary from the desire to rid itself of tempo-
rary oversupply,' 2 to gain a foothold in a new market while keeping
home prices high,' 3 or to drive all competitors out of an established
market. 4 Economists have historically agreed that at least the
from the injury of unfair trade practices.
Television Receiving Sets From Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. at 32,708.
Commissioner Stern also chastised the majority for not using enough diligence in its
search for facts but instead placing the burden of proving a lack of intent to import at prices
less than fair value after lifting of the antidumping order on the proponents of revocation.
Her own investigation of available data led her to the opinion that even if dumping did
occur with the lifting of the order, it would only nominally affect prices. She also found that
the decrease in imports of Japanese-manufactured television sets was a trend unlikely to be
reversed. Commissioner Stern concluded the majority simply did not have the necessary
evidence to support its prediction of "material injury" if the antidumping order was with-
drawn. Television Receiving Sets from Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. at 32,707-13.
o The court conducted its review of the ITC findings under the authority of 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981):
The court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding or conclusion
found...
(B) in an action brought [after a final determination by an administrative
agency], to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.
" J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (Reprinted 1966).
" Professor Viner labels the importer seeking fulfillment of this goal a practitioner of
"sporadic" dumping. Id. at 23-25.
13 Maintaining high prices at home by exporting surplus goods at less than fair value is
characteristic of "long-term," or "continuous," dumping. Viner classifies other goals of the
long-term dumper as the desire to maintain economics of scale which may result in surplus
production and the desire merely to stimulate export trade at the behest of the home gov-
ernment. Id. at 27-29.
" According to the Viner categorizations this attempt to drive all competitors out of the
import market is "predatory," or "malignant," dumping. A subcategory of "short-run," or
"intermittent," dumping, may also be employed "to maintain connections in a market in
which prices are on remaining considerations unacceptable,. . .[and] to retaliate against
dumping in the reverse direction." Id. at 23, 25-27. Viner's categorizations have become the
standard reference for classification of the types of dumping. For review of and amplifica-
tion upon the Viner scheme, see Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Dis-
crimination: United States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44,
46-47 (1958); W. WARES, THE THEORY OF DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL POLICY 3-12
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third of these goals is illegitimate, for pursuit of it results in tem-
porarily lower consumer prices which can be dramatically raised
once the importer has driven all competitors from the market.5
The debate concerning dumping thus centers on the remaining
question of whether dumpers who pursue either of the first two
goals actually damage the economy. "Free trade" economists have
long contended that it is improvident to levy duties on importers
who are fairly exploiting comparative economic advantages of their
home countries and thereby benefitting consumers in the country
of importation by undercutting prevailing market prices. 6 "Protec-
(1977); Weeks, Introduction to the Antidumping Law: A Form of Protection for American
Manufacturers, 35 ALE. L. REV. 182, 182-83 (1971).
18 One author summed up the argument against predatory dumping:
According to the theory of international free trade, free competition among na-
tions will maximize efficiency and result in lower prices, as each nation specializes
in producing those goods for which it is best suited. Short-run or predatory dump-
ing of the kind just described, because it derails this "natural law" of comparative
advantage, constitutes an unfair international trade practice, against which na-
tions espousing free trade principles may legitimately defend themselves.
Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled Economy Countries: The Polish Golf Cart Case
and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 221. For further commentary on
and condemnation of predatory dumping, see J. VINER, supra note 11, at 26; L. LLOYD, TAR-
IFFS: THE CASE FOR PROTECTION 158 (1955); Silverman, An Examination of the Antidump-
ing Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: United States Implementation of the
Antidumping Code Formulated in the Tokyo Round, 7 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 239,
241 (1979-80). Economists do differ on the question of whether predatory dumping in reality
can often be practiced. One author has argued that the predatory dumper must necessarily
have a monopoly in his home market to be able to cover the losses resulting from export of
goods at less than their
. 
fair market value. Also, the predatory dumper "must be sure that
his home market is effectively isolated from the market in which his goods are dumped, lest
the cheap goods be reimported and then be used to undercut the producer's high home
price." This set of circumstances, the author concludes, "is neither an easily arranged prac-
tice nor a common experience." Ehrenhaft, supra note 14, at 49. "Because the costs of pre-
dation are high and the gains speculative, the empirical evidence indicates that predatory
dumping is very rare." Myerson, A Review of Current Antidumping Procedures: United
States Law and the Case of Japan, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 167, 172 (1976). For other
explanations of why predatory dumping is the exception rather than the rule, see Schwartz
and Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH: L. REV.
831, 838-39 (1972); L. YEAGER AND D. TUERCK, FOREIGN TRADE AND U.S. POLICY: THE CASE
FOR FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 129 (1976). Although he had admitted predatory dumping
is a relatively rare phenomenon, another author has questioned whether a monopoly is first
necessary to be able to engage in the practice. "Many international markets have a regional
character, because of natural or artificial barriers, and predatory dumping may be worth-
while for a dominant supplier and be perfectly practicable." de Jong, The Significance of
Dumping in International Trade, 2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 162, 171-72 (1968).
'1 A typical defense of the free market-approach is offered by the authors of the following
excerpt:
What difference does it make to an import-competing industry or to thv domes-
tic economy as a whole if a foreign good is sold more cheaply here than in the
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tionist" economists have countered with the argument that the re-
sulting softening of demand for domestic goods is often unfairly
produced and always harmful.17 They contend unfairness and
harm are particularly probable when the foreign manufacturers are
granted export subsidies by their governments '8 or when infant in-
exporter's home market? The harm to the import-competing industry and the
benefit to the domestic economy is the same, regardless of the price charged
abroad. It hardly makes sense to establish an elaborate procedure for processing
complaints against foreigners who discriminate in favor of Americans. The cir-
cumstances that enable them to discriminate against their fellow countrymen may
be regrettable from some point of view; but to Americans, bargains are bargains.
L. YEAGER AND D. TUERCK, supra note 15, at 128. One author has insisted that there are
other advantages resulting from dumping other than lower consumer prices. Dumping might
also force a monopoly in the import market to lower its prices to be able to remain competi-
tive. In addition, dumping of raw materials may enable small manufacturers to reduce start-
up costs in the finished goods market. Note, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust
Law?, 74 YALE L. J. 707, 713 (1965). For other arguments supportive of the free trade ap-
proach, see de Jong, supra note 15, at 171; Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to
Trade-The United States and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
491, 498 (1972).
7 Professor Lloyd has argued on behalf of the protectionist approach that:
Experience indicates that even though the consumer may get a temporary wind-
fall on the purchase of products at bargain prices, the demoralizing effect on the
market makes the process undesirable on a long-term basis for all, including the
consumer. When dumping is used as a weapon to drive out competition, the con-
sumer pays a sufficiently higher price afterward to more than compensate for the
low dumping price. Even if no one is driven out of business, dumping can drive
the prices so low that the customer will suffer through shoddy merchandise and
inadequate service.
L. Lloyd, supra note 15, at 158-59.
Professor Viner has argued that dumping, whether predatory or not, is harmful because of
its uncertain duration. He contends that this uncertainty does not allow consumers and
producers in the importing country to adjust properly to dumping. J. VNER, supra note 11,
at 139. Another author has offered four arguments in favor of antidumping regulation:
First, although free trade raises a nation's welfare above the level obtained in
isolation, further gains may be had if limiting imports changes the terms of
trade. . . .Second, dynamic considerations. . .may make importation injurious in
itself. Unstable imports may do more harm by disrupting markets than good by
encouraging specialization and expanding consumers [sic] options. . . . Third,
normative goals may outweigh considerations of economic efficiency as a basis for
commercial policy. Particular import transactions may be inequitable. . . .Fourth,
in all probability the importing economy will not be perfectly competitive. In this
and the preceding two instances, restricted trade may be preferable to free trade if
corrective policy options are limited.
W. WARES, supra note 14, at 60. See also J. HOBSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 137 (1966),
which argues that overproduction of a good which leads to dumping indicates worldwide
overproduction in many cases. Dumping in such a case serves only to exacerbate a critical
economic situation. For another view of the protectionist argument, see Fisher, Dumping:
Confronting the Paradox of Internal Weakness and External Challenge, in ANTIDUMPING
LAW 23 (1979).
,' A government may offer such subsidies "to create employment, correct a balance-of-
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 14:597
dustries are targeted by the dumpers.1 9
Although dumping of manufactured goods has been widespread
for at least two centuries,20 nations have regulated it to significant
degrees only since the mid-1800's, when the Industrial Revolution
gave impetus to explosive growth in international trade.21 The
United States Congress' first attempt to control foreign dumping
in domestic markets, § 801 of the Revenue Act of 1916, imposed
criminal sanctions on the activity.22 When this act proved to be
ineffective,23 however, and when competitive European industry
began to rebuild after World War I,2' Congress attempted to fur-
ther shelter United States industry with passage of the Antidump-
ing Act of 1921.25 This legislation established the bifurcated ad-
ministrative procedure still used today to determine if dumping is
taking place, further, whether such practice is causing injury.26 It
also provided the mechanism for assessment of duties on imports
which were determined to be injurious.27
The Antidumping Act remained in effect as the United States'
statement on dumping until 1979,28 when Congress, responding to
payments deficit, develop a particularly valuable industry, or, archaically, on purely mercan-
tilistic grounds." W. WARES, supra note 14, at 8.
'9 J. VINER, supra note 11, at 145-46. Professor Viner adds that "[tlhere is surely even a
stronger case for the temporary protection of an established industry with a long record of
successful survival of the test of foreign competition, if such industry is threatened by for-
eign competition of an abnormal and temporary character." Id. at 146.
0o Id. at 35-36.
S1 For a review of the history of dumping regulations during the Industrial Revolution,
see id. at 35-50.
2 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976). Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up
to $5,000, one year's imprisonment, or both.
13 See Myerson, supra note 15, at 173. The author notes that the government has never
brought a criminal dumping action under the authority of the 1916 statute. Id.
24 Congress was evidently especially concerned with the challenge to the infant American
chemical industry made by resurgent German chemical firms. In addition, Congress desired
to protect American industry from a flood of imports predicted after the post-war devalua-
tion of European currencies. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 14, at 53.
25 Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-
71(1976)(repealed 1979)).
26 19 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1976)(repealed 1979). The bifurcated procedure originally required
the Secretary of the Treasury to determine 1) that a good was being imported to the United
States at less than its fair value in the country of export; 2) that an industry in the United
States was subject to injury or would be subject to injury due to the imports.
27 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1976)(repealed 1979).
28 Several minor amendments were made to the Act through the years. In 1954 Congress
vested the duty to determine whether injury has occured or will occur in the United States
Tariff Commission, which is now the ITC. Customs Simplifications Act of 1954, ch. 12 & 13,
§ 301, 68 Stat. 1138 (repealed 1979). Another amendment in 1975 required thc ITC to pub-
lish its findings in the Federal Register. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title III ch.
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the final negotiation of an international antidumping code at the
Tokyo Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade,29
passed the Trade Agreements Act.30 This legislation revoked the
Antidumping Act of 19211 and established "material injury" to a
domestic industry rather than mere "injury" as the harm the ITC
must Show to justify implementation of an antidumping order."2 In
addition it codified the "substantial evidence" standard of review
the Customs Court, now the Court of International Trade, must
use when testing whether an ITC determination has an adequate
factual basis.33
In 1980 Congress passed the Customs Court Act to complement
the Trade Agreements Act.3 4 This second piece of legislation
changed the name of the Customs Court to the Court of Interna-
tional Trade.3 5 It also granted the court full Article III and equity
powers, 6 and it enlarged the range of import disputes which would
fall under the court's jurisdiction. 7
The court has struggled throughout its history to define what
2, § 321(a)(2), 88 Stat. 2045 (amending § 201(b)(c) of the Antidumping Act of 1921)(re-
pealed 1979). For explanations of the provisions of the Antidumping Act, see Note, Injury
Determinations Under United States Law Before and After the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076, 1079-80 (1981). For a comprehensive view of the mechanics
of the provisions of the Act, see Baier, Substantive Interpretations Under the Antidumping
Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. REV. 409 (1965).
m: Agreement on Implementation of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Doc. No. MTN/NTM/W/232, April 9, 1979, reprinted in Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 56
(Supp. 26 1978-79).
So Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in vari-
ous sections of title 19 of the United States Code). For explanation of the provisions of the
Trade Agreements Act, see Silverman, supra note 15, at 239, 244-52; Note, supra note 28, at
1095-1107; Note, Judicial Review of Antidumping Cases and the Trade Agreements Act of
1979: Towards a Unified System of Review, 14 J. INr'L L. & EcoN. 101 (1979); Cohen, The
Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Executive Agreements, Subsidies, and Countervailing Du-
ties, 15 Txx. INT'L. L.J. 96 (1980); Note, Administering the Revised Antidumping Law: Allo-
cating Power Between the ITC and the Court of International Trade, 22 VA. J. INT'L L.
883, 888-93 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Revised Antidumping Law].
, 19 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp. V 1981).
:2 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b) (Supp. V 1981).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(Supp. V 1981).
, Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified in vari-
ous sections of titles 19 and 28 of the United States Code). For an explanation of the provi-
sions of the Act, see Customs Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 431-504 (1981); Revised
Antidumping Law, supra note 32, at 893-96.
28 U.S.C. § 251 (1982).
3 Id.
3 Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3729.
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these congressional acts require of it in its role as judge of the via-
bility of administrative determinations. The court has adopted the
tenet of administrative law that it will uphold determinations
which are validly based, regardless of whether the court would
draw the same conclusion from the given information." This defer-
ence has had little practical impact in some cases of review of ad-
ministrative determinations, for the judges have also indicated that
findings from administrative agencies must contain cogent and
persuasive reasoning backed by specific facts." The court will
closely scrutinize reports to determine whether they are supported
by the statutorily required levels of evidbnce. ° The court has also
U The reason for this review role was stated by the court in City Lumber Co. v. United
States:
Clearly Congress acted within its constitutional powers in enacting the An-
tidumping Act of 1921 .... Under that act Congress entrusted the making of the
determination of dumping and injury to designated executive officers. Hence, in
reviewing these determinations it is not the function of the court to substitute its
discretion for that of the legislative agents. It is the proper function of the court to
construe the enabling act, and to determine the meaning of any doubtful word,
phrase or provision.
City Lumber Co., 311 F. Supp 340, 345 (Cust. Ct. 1970). See also Pasco Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 477 F. Supp. 201, 220 n.18 (Cust. Ct. 1979); Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United
States, 475 F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
" See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 96 (Cust. Ct. 1980), in which the
court said the ITC had inadequately documented its finding that imports of portable type-
writers were injuring the domestic typewriter industry. Citing Supreme Court authority, the
court ruled:
This Court has relied on the 'simple but fundamental rule of administrative
law,' SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947), that the agency must set
forth clearly the grounds on which it acted. For '[w]e must know what a decision
means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.' United
States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co.,294 U.S. 499 .... And we
must rely on the rationale adopted by the agency if we are to guarantee the integ-
rity of the administrative process.
SCM Corp., 487 F. Supp. at 103, quoting Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe R. Co. v. Wichita
Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973). The court has also held in some cases that the ITC
findings must be rationally based on the available data. See, e.g., Sprague Elec. Co. v.
United States, 529 F. Supp. 676, 682-83 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981); Pasco Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 477 F. Supp. at 220.
40 The Supreme Court has defined "substantial evidence":
We have defined 'substantial evidence' as 'such relevant evidence as a reasona-
ble mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229. '(I)t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to
a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it
is one of fact for the jury.' NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306
U.S. 292, 300. This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial
evidence. NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 106.
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held that it will review decisions while taking into consideration
the congressional purposes behind the form of import restriction
involved.4
The cases establishing these standards involved questions of
whether new regulations of dumping would be required. In Matsu-
shita the ITC and the Court of International Trade were con-
fronted with the different problem of whether an existing order
should be continued. The ITC had administered this type of re-
view twice previously, but in both cases it was able to decide the
problems summarily because of peculiar facts.42 Matsushita
presented the first opportunity for both bodies to make full-scale
rulings concerning the characteristics of review of an existing
order.
The ITC determined it should base its position upon projections
of what the actions of the Japanese manufacturers would be if no
antidumping order existed.43 On the basis of its fact-finding the
ITC posted three scenarios it believed would occur with lifting of
the order. Noting first that the Japanese manufacturers were pres-
Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966). For specific instances of
application of the "substantial evidence" standard by the Court of International Trade, see
Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 312, 327-28 (Cust. Ct. 1980); Al-
berta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 789-91 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981);
Industrial Fasteners Group v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 885, 892-93 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
"' The court has said "that even when Congress has given wide authority to a Commis-
sion, it is the duty of a reviewing court to insure that the Commission's actions are harmoni-
ous with the national policy expressed." SCM Corp. v. United States, 487 F. Supp. at 103
(Cust. Ct. 1980). The court in SCM Corp. also quoted with approval Supreme Court lan-
guage that the administrative agency must keep in mind the intent of Congress when it
makes its findings:
To see whether those policies have been implemented we look to the Commis-
sion's own summary of the evidence, and particularly to the findings, formal or
otherwise, which the Commission has made. Just as we would overstep our duty
by undertaking to evaluate the evidence according to our own notions of the pub-
lic interest, we would shirk our duty were we summarily to approve the Commis-
sion's evaluation of the record without determining that the agency's evaluation
had been made in accordance with the mandate of Congress.
SCM Corp., 487 F.Supp. at 103, quoting Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United States, 355
U.S. 83, 88 (1957).
"' In Electric Golf Carts from Poland, Inv. No. 751-TA-1, USITC Pub. No. 1069 (1980),
the ITC found that no amount of dumping increase could improve the importer's market
share. In Potassium Chloride From Canada, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,083 (1981), the ITC found that
the importer's market share was so small that it in no way could affect the domestic market
price no matter how much of its goods it attempted to dump. To reach its results in these
two cases the ITC did not have to initiate the fact-finding mission of predicting the behavior
of importers in the face of a lifted antidumping order. This prediction was a central focus of
Matsushita. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
,' Television Receiving Sets From Japan, 46 Fed. Reg. 32,702, 32,704 (1981).
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ently acquiring increased production and pricing flexibility,44 the
ITC forecast a rapidly increasing period of demand for the televi-
sion industry and predicted that the Japanese would begin dump-
ing again if the antidumping order were lifted.4 5 This dumping
would trigger a suppression of prices and profits of domestic manu-
facturers."' Secondly, it found that the affiliated television manu-
facturers of the Japanese subsidiaries in the United States would
have difficulty producing sufficient quantities of inventory to meet
the new demand.47 The impetus would then exist for the Japanese
manufacturers to keep their market shares by flooding the Ameri-
can market with foreign-manufactured sets."s These sets would, of
course, be sold at less than fair value.4" Finally, the ITC found that
after lifting the proposed antidumping order the United States
would become a dumping ground for these same reasons not only
for fully-assembled television receivers but also for television com-
ponent parts.50 These scenarios provided enough evidence for the
ITC to find that "material injury" would indeed follow the lifting
of the antidumping order.5 1
On appeal, the Court of International Trade found the ITC's
reasoning unpersuasive.52 The court felt that it was proper for the
ITC to presume for its determination that any future imports with
or without an antidumping order would be sold at prices less than
fair value.53 But at that point, the court ruled, the ability of the
" Id. at 32,706. This flexibility would follow from the ability of the importers to reduce
prices after lifting of the antidumping order, which had previously penalized sales made at
less than fair value.
," Id. The ITC found the increase in demand could range as high as 50% in the following
three to five years.
I d.
I Id. The ITC had found that after imposition of the initial antidumping order, 10 Japa-
nese firms had established manufacturing operations of varying sophistication in the United
States. If the order was lifted, then the Japanese manufacturers would supplement this pro-
duction with goods manufactured in Japan, a combination which would undercut domestic
prices, the ITC said.
48 Id.
49 Id.
80 Id. The market in Asia and Europe for Japanese-manufactured picture tubes had re-
cently shown signs of softening, the ITC said. It thus feared dumping of these component
parts into the United States market if the antidumping order was lifted.
", Id. at 32,707.
"' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, No. 83-69 slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade July
14, 1983), reprinted in 17 Cust. B. & Dec., Aug. 10, 1983, at 37.
53 Id. at 39-40. The court ruled the ITC could make this presumption because the plain-
tiffs had not sought a review by the International Trade Administration of the Department
of Commerce of that body's original finding that imports were being made at less than fair
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ITC to make presumptions ended. Also, in Matsushita the court
found the ITC had improperly presumed that upon lifting of the
antidumping order the foreign producers would automatically in-
crease their imports.54 The court held that in so presuming, the
ITC had impermissibly placed on the proponents of the repeal of
the order the burden of proving they would not increase their im-
ports.55 Instead, the court ruled the only burden of proof the ITC
could place on such a party in a review case was cooperation with
the investigation by supplying requested information."
The court said that this misplacement of the burden of proof
resulted from an incorrect assumption of the purpose behind the
review function of the ITC. 7 The ITC had felt it necessary to
honor the protectionist intent behind antidumping laws by treat-
ing the existing order as prima facie valid. In so doing, the court
said the commissioners failed to grasp the true purpose behind the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979."9 That purpose was not to restrict
value. See Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, From Japan, 35 Fed. Reg.
18,549 (1970) for the original determination.
5, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, No. 83-69 slip op. (Ct. Int'l. Trade July
14, 1983), reprinted in 17 Cust. B. & Dec., Aug. 10, 1983, at 41-42.
I id.
6 Id.
" Id. at 42-43. The court held that:
[i]n the review, the ITC saw itself in the position of having to honor the basic
protective intent of the antidumping law; that is to say, it believed it had to treat
the continuing validity of the existing antidumping order as a premise of the re-
view. This led it to go beyond its neutrally stated objective and to engage in a
presumption that injury would recur .... However, although the purpose of an-
tidumping duties is unquestionably to protect American industry, the provision
for review of final injury determinations cannot be given the same protective mo-
tive. In the opinion of the Court, in order for the review provision to operate con-
sistently within the structure of this law and in order for it to function in harmony
with one of the international agreements which the law was intended to imple-
ment, the review must establish the continuing need for the injury determination.
If it cannot do so, the original determination has become vestigial.
Id.
" Id.
5 Id. at 43-44. The court noted that the Trade Agreements Act had expressly approved
the recently promulgated International Antidumping Code. The court then explained:
Article 9(a) of the Code relates to the review of antidumping duty orders and
provides that 'an anti-dumping duty shall remain in force only as long as, and to
the extent necessary to counter-act dumping which is causing injury .... It would
be unreasonable to take or maintain the potent measure of these laws for anything
more diffused than the threat of material injury. It must follow that when the
continued necessity for the antidumping duty is placed in question by a change in
circumstances, the review required by [19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1)] must either find
reason for continuation of the duty or lead to revocation.
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the flow of imports but rather to assure that international trade
would not be inhibited by regulations which had outlived their
usefulness.60 Thus, the court felt, sustaining an antidumping order
over a prolonged period would be the extraordinary ruling, not vice
versa.
6
'
The court also criticized the ITC's determination that with the
lifting of the antidumping order future import levels would be ma-
terially injurious. Conceding that such a prediction must necessa-
rily be made," the court nonetheless found that the ITC's esti-
mates of importers' ability to increase production capacity was
factually insufficient to support the conclusion that imports would
increase." The court also discounted the probability that the ITC's
three scenarios would ever come to pass."" For each scenario the
0 Id.
61 Id.
Id. at 41.
es Id at 44-47. The court questioned the ITC's assertion that, given a coming rapid in-
crease in demand for television receivers, the Japanese manufacturers would exploit produc-
tion capacity flexibility to increase dumping. The court said that in light of the establish-
ment of extensive American manufacturing operations by the Japanese, it would be
"irrational" for them to increase imports rather than to increase production at their Ameri-
can plants. At most the foreign manufacturers would temporarily supplement this latter
form of production with short-term increases in imports. Such short-term "penetrations"
would not cause material injury, the court ruled. Id.
" Id. at 45-47. Generally the court found that the three scenarios (see supra notes 43-48
and accompanying text) were predictions which lacked substantial "factual predicate(s)."
The ITC had failed to include in the basis of data collected for the case facts obtained
concerning supply of and demand for Japanese televisions in markets other than the United
States, facts concerning "important component parts of the products in question," or facts
involving "other measurable economic factors upon which it is reasonable to base
inferences."
The court went into detail of its criticism of the ITC's second scenario, a prediction that
the Japanese would in the short-run increase their dumping to supplement production by
their affiliated plants in the United States. The court held such an increase would benefit,
not injure, the domestic industry, because it would secure a market share increase for the
affiliated producers, who were considered to be part of the domestic industry. A mere shuf-
fling of market shares of domestic producers should not result in any overall harm to the
industry, the court said. Id.
The court later modified its opinion concerning the second scenario. In the course of a
subsequent opinion denying a motion for rehearing, the court said it wished to clarify that
the problem with the second scenario was that the ITC's prediction of increased dumping to
supplement production of affiliates was improperly based on a finding of coordination be-
tween the Japanese producers and their American affiliates. This coordination had been
found not to exist by the ITC itself when it decided to include the affiliates in the domestic
industry figures, the court ruled. This earlier categorization of the domestic affiliates caused
the later finding of coordination to be invalid, so the ITC did not even have logical reason-
ing on its side when it posited the second scenario. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
United States, No. 83-192 slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 13, 1983), reprinted in 17 Cust. B. &
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court found that the ITC lacked the requisite "substantial evi-
dence" from which to draw its conclusions.65
More generally, the court held that in a case involving review of
an existing regulation the ITC must test the validity of the regula-
tion with more than mere assumptions." Citing appellate court de-
cisions in other contexts of administrative review,67 the court said
that the ITC must base any estimates upon substantive, clearly
documented data.68 The weight of authority was so clearly against
the ITC finding that outright reversal was required rather than a
remanding for further fact-finding.6
This decision by the Court of International Trade provides an
important indication of what the court will require of the ITC
when it conducts reviews of existing antidumping orders. The deci-
sion in Matsushita indicates the court will not be as deferential to
the ITC as it has been in other contexts in the past.70 Further, the
Dec., Nov. 9, 1983, at 43.
" Matsushita, 17 Cust. B. & Dec., Aug. 10, 1983, at 49.
Id. at 47-48.
17 Id. at 47-49. The court called Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607 (1979) "by far the most instructive of the many cases cited by the parties." In that
case the Supreme Court held invalid a regulation promulgated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) which would have reduced the permissible exposure of
workers to the carcinogenic chemical benzene from 10 parts per million (ppm) to 1 ppm.
The Court ruled that OSHA had failed to provide substantial evidence that the lowering of
the exposure level was "appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment." The burden
of proof was on OSHA to show that the 10 ppm regulation presented a health risk, and the
court held that the agency had not met that burden with the necessary substantial evidence.
The court in Matsushita found this result particularly relevant "because the agency in that
case was operating in a relatively unknown area to an even greater extent than the ITC."
Matsushita, 17 Cust. B. & Dec., Aug. 10, 1983, at 47-48.
The court also cited the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Boise Cascade Corp.
v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) as authority. There, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the agency lacked substantial evidence that the system of pricing used by several plywood
manufacturers was anticompetitive. The Matsushita court said Boise Cascade reflected its
holding that "(in the interests of enforcement [agencies] may not take leave of normal
practice, may not place burdens where they should not be placed, and may not use imper-
missible assumptions and suppositions rather than substantial evidence." Matsushita, 17
Cust. B. & Dec., Aug. 10, 1983, at 48.
I' ld. at 49.
*' Id. The court determined that remand was unnecessary because "this is not a case in
which the ITC failed to sufficiently articulate its rationale to allow judicial review" or "a
case in which a corpus of correct data has to be investigated for the first time." Id.
"0 This stricter scrutiny of ITC determinations is in part a result of the expansion of the
court's powers by the Customs Court Act (see supra note 34 and accompanying text). "This
expansion of the court's authority necessarily entails a reciprocal diminution in the discre-
tion formerly enjoyed by the ITC in antidumping matters. The court's activist role... may
therefore be merely the logical result of the court growing into its expanded role." Revised
Antidumping Law, supra note 30, at 905.
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court's ruling that the only burden on a proponent of revocation is
that of cooperating with the inquiry 71 in effect places upon govern-
ment customs attorneys the burden to present evidence sufficient
for the ITC to confidently estimate that "material injury" would
follow the lifting of an antidumping order. This burden is in-
creased by the court's insistence that when considering future in-
tent to import at prices less than fair value the ITC may not pre-
sume either that the protective order is presently restraining such
sales72 or that the failure of the proponents of revocation to con-
vince officials they will not recommence such sales shows they are
probable.73 These rules, therefore, force the government to shoul-
der the difficult task of producing persuasive, concrete evidence on
the evasive element of intent.
The problem with making an attempt to predict the future
course of any case before the ITC and the Court of International
Trade, however, is that in the past the two bodies have not always
been consistent in their decision-making patterns. The ITC espe-
cially has been subject to criticism that its reviews are hopelessly
confused and offer no pattern of the principles under which it op-
erates in decision-making.74 Criticism has also been leveled at the
court in recent cases for varying its scrutiny of ITC reviews. 75 In
addition, the court's power to ignore principles of res judicata,7 6
"' Matsushita, 17 Cust. B. & Dec., Aug. 10, 1983, at 41.
71 Id. See also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
73 Matsushita, 17 Cust. B. & Dec., Aug. 10, 1983, at 41.
7, For criticism of the inconsistency found in ITC reviews, see B. DALE, ANTI-DuMPING
LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 193-94 (1980); Hendrick, The United States Antidumping
Act, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 914, 924-26 (1964); Herzstein, The Role of Law and Lawyers Under
the New Multilateral Trade Agreements, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COmP. L. 177, 180 (1979); Note,
Innovation and Confusion in Recent Determinations of the Tariff Commission Under the
Antidumping Act, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 212, 238 (1971).
7' See Revised Antidumping Law, supra note 30, at 905-09.
7' The Supreme Court has explained why the court does not have to follow the doctrine
of res judicata:
There of course should be an end of litigation... in customs matters as in other
tax cases, but circumstances justify limiting the finality of the conclusion in cus-
toms controversies to the identical importation. The business of importing is car-
ried on by large houses between whom and the Government there are inumerable
transactions .... The evidence which may be presented in one case may be much
varied in the next. The importance of a classification and its far-reaching effect
may not have been fully understood or clearly known when the first litigation was
carried through.
United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1927).
See also Rao, A Primer on Customs Court Practice, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 581, 599 (1974).
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the individual peculiarities of dumping cases,"' and the distribu-
tion of judgeships so that only a bare majority may be members of
a single political party7" all promote a certain non-conformity in
court decisions. Based on these conditions, future ITC decisions to
continue antidumping orders, even if based on facts similar to
those in Matsushita, may well be upheld by different judges on the
court.
The other important aspect of Matsushita lies in its potential
for reducing the restrictions on imports into the American market.
The court's holding that the ITC must consider the anti-restraint
intent of the Trade Agreements Act and other international agree-
ments when considering the validity of an antidumping order, 9
taken in concert with the court's pronouncements on burdens of
proof and evidentiary requirements," indicates an attitude that
antidumping orders should be short-lived. Matsushita in this re-
spect moves the court closer to the position of the free trade econ-
omist, at least on this issue of the viability of continuing an-
tidumping controls."1
At a time in which many American political and economic lead-
ers have forcefully advocated import controls,8 Matsushita may
soon be considered an anomaly in the history of the Court of Inter-
" See United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 235-36; Hendrick, supra note
71, at 924.
" The appointment of judges to the Court of International Trade is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 251(a) (Supp. V 1981):
(a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, nine judges who shall constitute a court of record to be known as the United
States Court of International Trade. Not more than five of such judges shall be
from the same political party.
" See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
'0 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
' These economists argue, as the court does, that recent international agreements to
which the United States has been a signatory and upon which Congress has been basing
antidumping legislation share the goal of freeing international trade from excessive re-
straint. As a result they would make the burden of showing injury heavier, as the court in
Matsushita did. See, e.g., Baier, supra note 28, at 453-56; Barcelo, supra note 16, at 526.
See also 19 U.S.C. § 2502(2) (Supp. V 1981), which states that among the purposes of the
Trade Agreements Act is "to foster the growth and maintenance of an open trading system."
For a view that the General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade adopt not a free market but a
protectionist approach, at least concerning the injury test, see R. DALE, supra note 71, at
192.
82 See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1983, at D-2, col. 1; N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1983, at B-11, col. 4;
Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1983, at F-1, col. 1; Wash. Post, May 16, 1983, at A-1, col. 2; Kuttner,
The Free Trade Fallacy, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 28, 1983, at 16, 16-22; A Rising Tide of Pro-
tectionism, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 1983, at 26, 26-28.
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national Trade.83 If the Matsushita approach is affirmed and ex-
tended to other import contexts, however, the long-term result will
be a significant liberalization of foreign trade policy.8 4 For the pre-
sent, Matsushita stands on its own as a small victory for free trade
economists in the ever-continuing war of words and ideas between
those who would open American markets to the world and those
who would begin slowly to cut them off.8"
Stephen E. Farish
83 The influence of politics on the policy of the court is likely to be at least somewhat
blunted by the statute which allows only five of the nine judges of the court to be affiliated
with a single political party. See supra note 79.
See supra note 16, and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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